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The Essential MM Part 4: Reason and Imagination: Notes for Class on 27/11/13

First take on what it is all about

Whereas traditional natural philosophy sustained itself mainly by well-reasoned thinking and debate, the growth of scientific disciplines such as chemistry, physics and biology added a new dimension: evidence, based on observation and experiment.

Some academics have now come to believe that all other forms of intellectual thought are inferior to the objective, evidence-based scientific method, to the extent that there is no place for them in serious study. This is taken to such extremes that concepts that do not fit into a conventional scientific classification (e.g. individual consciousness) must be excluded, even in situations where common sense would suggest that they have a role to play. This was particularly evident in the behaviourist approach to the social sciences.

MM attributes this the efforts made by philosophers in the past to rationalise elements of human behaviour to an excessive degree. This is particularly true of Descartes’ approach to the question of the human mind, treating it as something parallel to and separate from physical matter.

This artificial separation is unhelpful. We need to accept that we live in a world of reality, in which consciousness, individuality and subjective judgement have vital roles to play. It is also unhelpful to think that every subject of human study must be treated in a similar way. Thus physics may require abstraction and the exclusion of individual experience. Other subjects, such as the study of human behaviour, require a different approach.

We need to categorise things in order to conduct analysis. Sometimes this  leads to problems when we have to force things into categories where they do not comfortably fit. The question of consciousness is particularly difficult.

Do some disciplines (academic and quasi-academic) have an inferiority complex? Their teachings cannot be proven with the same mathematical clarity as those of physics. So they impose spurious scientific orthodoxies, sometimes in defiance of common sense.

As she often does, Mary starts by quoting a really extreme position In order to set a context for her subsequent argument. The quote from Peter Atkins suggests that he believes that all other forms of study are inferior to science. He made just be making a distinction between the thoroughness with which a scientist would investigate a new phenomenon and the way in which a poet would describe it. Nevertheless, as quoted here, it sounds pretty strident. (SJS note: turns out he is a plonker after all)

Why was Peter Atkins so disparaging about poetry? It is like an architect disparaging an impressionist artist for drawing buildings without using a ruler or a set-square. One can’t help feeling that he was trying to make a different point: that to be sure that a discovery is genuinely new, one has to evaluate it by scientific methods. Even this argument would be limited: artists invent new things all the time, in terms of shape, texture, colour, sound etc.

As a philosopher, MM feels threatened by Peter Atkins’ argument. But she understands that theories survive because of their emotional as well as their rational content.

To what extent do we agree with Mary's claim on page 307 students face a kind of science teaching which never mentions the social attitudes and background assumptions that influence scientific thought?

It is true that the arts and sciences are, to some extent, placed into separate bunkers.

From pages 308 to 311 Mary looks at Lucretius and his theory of atomism. She describes it as an attack on religion, when it is more an attack on blind superstition. He is trying to offer a coherent explanation of how the world works, to stop people making human sacrifices to change the way in which the wind is blowing. It was a very impressive theory for someone to have developed in 50 BC.

She makes some interesting observations about the nature of theories on page 311. Is it is not the case, though, that with the advent of the scientific method, theories now are required to be more precise from the outset? Vague suppositions just will not stand scrutiny.

It is natural for human beings to prefer continuity or permanence to constant change, since change is, by definition, a threat to lasting accomplishments.

Faced with two equally convincing theories, they will tend to favour the one that argues in favour of permanence

People build substantial reputations based on particular theories. If those theories come under threat, they will defend them beyond the boundaries of logic.

On page 312 she talks about the determinism becoming an article of faith. She could say that scientists develop an emotional attachment to theories. This in itself is not scientific. What is her point regarding mechanism? Is she just saying that this is an even more attractive theory because it allocates even more power to human beings?

On page 313 she returns to her examination of atomism. She seems to be saying that it is because of this theory that science is very often antireligious. She then criticises it because of its very narrow view of what religion is. But I wonder if it is not the case that any advance on scientific knowledge is going to push religion back somewhat. We often use religion to explain the unexplained. As science offers better insights, these explanations become unnecessary. I wonder if she is not being hard on poor old Lucretius who was only trying to persuade people to view the world in a more rational way than offering random acts to please the gods.

At the end of page 315 and the top of page 316, what do we think she is talking about when she says that we need to compare those visions to articulate them more clearly to think them through so as to see what they commit us to? She says it is necessarily philosophic business. Presumably she is talking not about scientific facts but the uses to which science may be put. She has a good image in the philosophic plumber. Someone who knows how the philosophical angle matters. In the past, of course, this would not have seemed a particularly radical idea at all. Scientists would have considered themselves to be philosophers first and foremost.

Suddenly she is off talking about poetry (316/317). She is continuing the fight against the arrogance of Mr Atkins. Society needs a range of intellectual skills to deal with the world. Poetry gives forceful expression to good and bad ideas. Has she lost track of the point? In the past, Aristotle or Lucretius might make educated guesses about how the world all universe worked. They did not attempt to carry out experiments to establish whether they were right. With the advent of the scientific method, this has changed. A person putting forward a theory about the movement of the stars would need to provide some evidence to back that up.

On page 319 we may recognise some of what she says about the respect which people have for science and the consequences of that. People can declare war on science; look at Prince Charles. It is also true that some forms of study dress themselves up in scientific clothing whilst not being as rigorous as they should be. There are numerous examples in the worlds of business, physical training diet and nutrition etc.

What do you think she means on page 320 when she says scientists have to select for their investigation patterns which fit patterns in the world they are going to investigate?

We return to atomism and its enduring influence. She emphasises the need to move beyond it. It is an idea which has outlived its usefulness. But is it not remarkable that this idea has endured for 2000 years and in many respects has proved to be correct?

M and M continues her criticism of atomism on page 322 speaking of its thinness as a philosophy for life. There are gaps in the explanation that atomism provides. There are also errors in her own explanation. Look at what she has to say about billiard balls. The main weakness in the atomists’ theory is that it does not account for change. On page 323 she shows a how powerful idea such as atomism can hold up progress.

On page 324 we can follow the argument that she is making but why is she making it? Is it because the metaphysical aspect of philosophy has stifled progress? We may be uncomfortable with change But if we classify it as unreal, we will fail to investigate things that needs to be understood.

On page 326 she continues her attack against the atomists because they claim that only the material is real. Her objection is that this theory leaves no room for the products of the brain. It denies a place for experience. She is objecting also because the emotional appeal of the theory has enabled it to last for so long.

What is the purpose of the discourse on explanations which we find on page 327? Is she trying to tell physicists to stay within the boundaries of their own science?

On page 328 the problem comes more clearly into view. Because Descartes describes the mind as a substance separate from matter, scientists tended to set it to one side. She then describes how this sets a trap for the social sciences. The social sciences have a problem, however, in that they are used to make important decisions about other human beings despite the fact that they are based on theories which often lack definitive proof.

On page 332 she gives a good description of why consciousness is a completely different topic for study than any other. The questions it raises are about the nature of a person as a whole. Does this in itself pose a challenge? Science tends to deal with complicated subjects by breaking them down into their component parts. She describes why the problem matters and its complexity. She does not attempt to solve it.

On page 333 she recognises the need for the objective scientific method. But she feels we have now reached the stage where consciousness has to be brought back into the equation.

On page 334 she describes the ridiculous dilemma in which the behaviourists find themselves. But it is one thing to say that there must be a place made for consciousness, quite another to find how you are going to continue to proceed scientifically.

Over the next few pages Mary argues the case for valuing one's own experience and points out the weakness in Descartes' view of the individual in isolation. She shows how as babies are conditioned to learn language, we are also conditioned to accept that we are social animals living with others.

On page 338 she attempts to deal with the extreme scepticism which philosophers have sometimes used as a basis on which to found their own rationality. She is trying to clear the ground for her own point of view and the old arguments get in the way. In the process she does an injustice to Descartes who had different concerns. He was trying to create a method by which the products of systematic objective thought could be clearly represented and be capable of withstanding challenge.

The idealist and the materialist views of the world require too much force-fitting to be completely sustainable. Nor can consciousness be slotted into the realm of physics. Physical concepts are highly specialised in a way the consciousness is not. She seems to think that physics has natural boundaries and that sometimes people try to use it outside those boundaries, where it has no proper role to play.

On page 344 she explains that the subjective and objective standpoints are two parts of one entity: human experience. The two angles often need to be distinguished for thought. But both of them are essential and inseparable aspects of our normal experience.

She concludes with a look at the peculiar position of physics. But she leaves  unanswered the question of how a science would work or even how it  would look when both objective analysis and subjective consideration had roles to play.